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Most occupational choice models introduce only two options for agents: entrepreneurial 
activities or wage-employment. However, these models represent inadequately the labor 
force distribution from developing countries, where an important proportion of the total 
work force are self-employed workers. Some models introduce self-employment as an 
occupational choice. These works have a common feature: when in equilibrium, wage 
earners belong to the lower end of the income distribution. Nevertheless, for a large set of 
developing countries, peasants and small proprietors are part of a self-employment sector 
that can mostly be found in the lower end of the income distribution. In contrast with 
previous efforts, in this work self-employment formation is consistent with data from most 
developing countries. We pay special attention to the conditions under which either the 
economy ends in a low income equilibrium where self-employment is the only form of 
production, or alternatively, the economy ends in a high income equilibrium with a well 
developed labor market. We study some public policy issues, paying special attention to role 
of capital markets and the efficiency of schooling.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Traditional general equilibrium models in economics consider only one occupational 
choice: workers. Firms are simply anonymous entities for whom agents work for a 
salary. Nevertheless, there have been some efforts which try to build models with a 
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richer set of occupational choices. Lucas’s work (1978) is one of the most representative 
early efforts in this direction: he builds a model where agents, depending on their 
entrepreneurial abilities, choose between being entrepreneurs or workers. In a different 
type of model, developed by Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), agents differ on their level 
of risk aversion: agents with low risk aversion will choose entrepreneurial activities. 
However, these representations of the occupational choices of agents are probably 
adequate for developed countries, where most agents are either entrepreneurs or workers. 
Nonetheless, these models are an inadequate way of representing the labor force 
distribution from less developed countries, where an important proportion of the 
population are self-employed workers.
1 Any research work whose main purpose is to 
analyze and comprehend the main economic and social problems faced by the poorest 
people in developing countries must include self-employment formation. 
Banerjee and Newman (1993) built a model where self-employment is an 
occupational choice and the decisions are based on an initial wealth distribution. 
Because of the existence of a collateral, rich individuals can receive a loan in order to 
become high-scale entrepreneurs, while agents located in the middle of the initial wealth 
distribution receive smaller loans which allow them to enter self-employment with a 
low-scale production process. On the other hand, without a high enough collateral, 
agents in the lower end of the wealth distribution can only join wage-employment. 
However, it is important to notice that, in developing countries, an important proportion 
of agents that have self-employment as their occupational choice depend on economic 
activities that provide only a subsistence level of income and are poorer than wage 
earners. Furthermore, some empirical studies show that besides being an important and 
growing sector in some developing countries, self employment can be found mostly in 
the lower end of the income distribution.
2 Therefore, it seems that the model developed 
by Banerjee and Newman (1993) does not accommodate these stylized facts for 
developing countries. 
More models that attempt to study self-employment dynamics have been developed. 
For example, Antunes and Cavalcanti (2002) build a general equilibrium model where 
agents are differentiated by their entrepreneurial ability (as in Lucas (1978)); however, 
as in Banerjee and Newman (1993), wage earners belong to the lower end of the income 
 
1 For a group of African countries, Mead and Liedhold (1998) report that workers in some form of 
self-employment double the amount of agents engaged in wage employment; furthermore, a work by Galli 
and Kucera (2003) for 14 Latin American countries reports that in 1997 the average relative size of 
self-employment was 27%, with a three points increase in only seven years. Furthermore, a work by Mezal 
(1998) presents data for Mexico where 62% of individuals without schooling have self-employment as its 
occupational choice. 
2 On a meta-analysis that includes several empirical studies, Van der Sluis, Van Praag and Vijverberg (2003) 
point out that there is great consistency between studies that find that education lowers the likelihood of 
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distribution. 
Our work is an effort to build a model that rationalizes empirical observations for 
developing countries where wage earners’ income is higher than that of agents in 
self-employment. We build a general equilibrium model where the occupational choice 
decision is endogenous to the model and, as in Lucas (1978), the amount of human 
capital plays a decisive role. On a key assumption of our model, we introduce two 
production functions, one that uses high skill labor and, alternatively, a self-employment 
production process that requires only low skill labor. All agents have access to both 
technologies. On a second key assumption, we introduce a labor market for high skill 
workers. In our model, agents will optimally choose between entrepreneurial activities 
or wage-employment. At equilibrium, we will show that (probably not very far from 
reality) some well educated agents will not become high-skilled entrepreneurs since this 
occupation provides a low income at their skill level; however, since their skill level is 
high enough to receive an attractive income as a worker, they will choose to enter the 
labor market and will turn down the option for running a self-employment firm that uses 
a low skill production technology. Therefore, in our model, wage earners have a higher 
income than agents in self-employment; this result is consistent with observations from 
developing countries. 
Empirical studies argue that improved managerial ability has a positive impact on 
entrepreneurial activities since it enhances the expected income from these activities. 
However, this channel also moves in the opposite direction, where schooling has a 
negative impact on entrepreneurial activities since agents leave self-employment and 
move to wage-employment (see Lee (1999), Blau (1985), and Vanpraag and Cramer 
(2001)). Our model supports these observations: at low levels of human capital, an 
improvement in schooling attainments produces a transition from self-employment 
toward wage-employment, while at high levels of human capital, improved education 
creates a migration from wage-employment favoring entrepreneurial activities. 
Looking into empirical data, we see that still an important percentage of low human 
capital agents choose to be poorly paid workers, even if the average income from 
self-employment is higher. Probably the lack of initial wealth (as in Banerjee and 
Newman (1993)) or risk aversion (as in Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979)) helps to explain 
this fact. It seems that the complete story is a combination of three explanatory 
variables: human capital, risk aversion and initial wealth. However, besides the technical 
difficulties of introducing to the model a joint distribution function, this work will 
concentrate on human capital because of two additional reasons: it is easier to collect 
data relating income with years of schooling in order to make empirical testing of the 
model, and secondly, empirical findings (see Van der Sluis, Van Praag, and Vijverberg 
(2003), and Vanpraag and Cramer (2001)) show that education is the crucial variable in 
occupational choice decisions, entrepreneurship selection and entrepreneurial success in 
developing countries. 
For reasons later explained, in contrast to previous efforts, our model is static. In the 
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attention to the initial conditions under which the economy either converges to a modern 
economy with a well-developed labor market, or one where self-employment is the only 
form of production. In our case, we study conditions where the only equilibrium is either 
self-employment or a modern economy with entrepreneurs and wage earners. We lack 
an analysis of convergence; nevertheless, our simpler setup allows for a broader analysis 
of policy issues. 
A crucial issue that Banerjee and Newman (1993) want to address is why some 
countries become economies with entrepreneurs employing workers in large factories, 
while other countries remain represented mainly by small proprietors and peasants. 
Unfortunately, in the model they build, the size of business firms is exogenous to the 
model. Therefore, they cannot study the conditions under which the economy is 
represented by small or large firms. In our work, where the size of business firms is 
endogenous to the model, we overcome this problem. 
This paper will address the relationship between per capita income and the relative 
size of the self-employment sector. We prove that this relationship is not necessarily 
negative: we build economies where policies that increase the relative size of the 
self-employment sector can also produce a higher per capita income. Additionally, this 
work will address some policy issues, paying special attention to the presence of 
borrowing constraints and the efficiency of schooling. 
 
 
2.    AN ECONOMY WITH SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
 
Is the lack of job opportunities what pushes agents into self-employment? For 
example, Harris and Todaro (1969) argue that workers might temporarily be forced to 
join low productive activities, where scarcity of jobs and costly job search are in good 
part responsible. The answer to this question is extremely important for our purposes. If 
the existence of self-employment is explained by a lack of opportunities, then a 
disequilibrium model or one with labor market rigidities could be most appropriate to 
study self-employment dynamics (instead of using a general equilibrium setup). 
However, recent empirical findings suggest that self-employment selection is a decision 
based on income maximization rather than the result of lack of employment 
opportunities (see Van der Sluis, Van Praag, and Vijverberg (2003), Psacharopoulos 
(1994), and Maloney (1999)). Therefore, it seems adequate to choose a rational choice 
type model in order to address the occupational choice issues from developing 
economies. 
Our economy has a continuum of agents which are identified by their educational 
level. More precisely, 
 
[] 0,1 ∈ i , 
 
where  1 =
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to build a model where the level of human capital is an exogenous variable because of 
two main reasons: first of all, to introduce dynamic decisions will greatly complicate the 
model, and secondly, an exogenous human capital distribution will allow us to analyze 
several public policy alternatives. 
Agents can perform two types of activities: low-skill and high-skill. These abilities 
can be used either in entrepreneurial activities or wage-employment. We introduce a 
) (i h  function that transforms schooling into low-skill productivity. Probably not far 
from reality, we assume that low-skill productivity is independent from schooling and 
that all agents are equally capable of performing low-skill activities, that is   
 
.    all for    = ) ( i h i h  
 
We now introduce the function  ) (i H , which represents the productivity level-while 
performing a high skill occupation-of an agent with schooling level  i . Probably not far 
away from reality, all agents are born with a given level of high- skill productivity that 
can be improved with more years of schooling. That is, we assume that  0 > (0) H  and 
that  0 > ) (i H′  for all  0 ≥ i . For a wage, agents can offer their low or high-skill 
abilities to the market. 
Our economy has two types of production technologies. The first one requires 
low-skill labor, and is represented by
3  
 
. } , { min = ) , ( h K K h Q  
 
That is, an agent that decides to be a low skill technology entrepreneur contributes with 
h  units of low skill labor
4, and chooses the amount of capital  K  that maximizes his 
income as a low-skill entrepreneur (LSE). That is,   
 
, } , { min = ) ( rK h K i Ih −  
 
where  r  represents the rental price of capital, which is an exogenous variable to the 
model (the following section will further discuss this assumption). In order to have a 
well defined maximization problem, we introduce an exogenous borrowing constraint: 
the maximum amount of capital to borrow for a LSE is  k .
5 Furthermore, in order to 
 
 
3 In order to simplify the presentation, we adopt a Leontieff technology; nevertheless, most of the results of 
the paper remain unchanged introducing instead a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
4 We assume that agents that choose to be a low-skill entrepreneur provide the labor for production and are 
not allowed to hire other low skill workers. This assumption greatly simplifies the analysis and allows us to 
concentrate in the study of self-employment formation. 
5 Other works also assume the existence of market imperfections and introduce borrowing constraints. For GERARDO JACOBS  130 
capture a fact from most developing countries (e.g., shortage of capital relative to labor), 
we assume that  h k < ; therefore, income is represented by 
 
. ) (1 = ) ( r k i Ih −  
 
As we mentioned before, there is an alternative production technology, one that uses 
high-skill workers. An agent  i  that decides to operate a high-skill firm, requires  K  
units of capital, provides  ) (i H  units of administrative work, and hires  H l  units of 
high skill (HS) labor.
6 The production technology is represented by   
 
. } ), ( { min = ) , ), ( ( H H l i KH l K i H Q  
 
Therefore, the income of an agent i   that decides to become a high-skill 
entrepreneur (HSE) is   
 
. } ), ( { min = ) ( rK wl l i KH i I H H H − −  
 
An important difference between the HS and the LS technologies is that the HS 
technology requires two types of high-skill workers: HS labor and an administrator of 
capital (a high-skill occupation that is performed by the owner of the firm). Additionally, 
in order to simplify matters, notice that we have assumed that there is no market for 
administrators, which means that a high-skill entrepreneur (HSE) can only use his/her 
high skill abilities in order to fulfill this activity. We know that a HSE will optimally 
choose  ) ( = i H K lH , therefore 
 
]. ) ( ) ( [ = ) ( r i H w i H K i I H H − −  
 
Notice that, since  ) (i H  is increasing in  i , a highly educated agent will be a better 
administrator and will optimally hire more labor than a less capable one (i.e., a bigger 
firm size).
7 As in the low-skill (LS) technology case, in order to have a well defined 
maximization problem, we introduce a borrowing constraint where  K  represents the 
 
example, the work by Banerjee and Newman (1996) introduce a borrowing constraint that depends on the 
amount of collateral. 
6 As in previous works, we could think of the entrepreneur as an administrator that performs monitoring 
activities; without an administrator, effort is low and production is zero. 
7 On a following section, this assumption will allow us to study the average size of business firms; in the 
work by Banerjee and Newman (1996), this can not be done since the firm size is exogenous to the model: a 
larger modern sector can only be represented with an increase in the number of identical firms.   AN OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE MODEL FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  131 
constraint for a HSE. Notice that the rental price of capital is the same whether you 
borrow for a high or a low-skill firm. This reflects that the probability of default is the 
same one in both capital markets. 
To assume that the HS technology uses HS labor (and not LS labor) is central to the 
results of this work since it introduces a labor market for HS labor that opens additional 
occupational choices for highly educated agents. As will be explained in the following 
section, this assumption will allow us to have a group of middle income agents that work 
for a salary and that are richer than agents in self-employment. 
Wrapping up, low skills can only be used in self-employment activities, while 
high-skill labor can be used either in HS entrepreneurial activities or in 
wage-employment. That is, there are only three occupational choices, where the set 
 represents these choices. } , , { H W h O =
8 Equations 2 and 3 represent the income for 
HSE and LSE respectively, while the income for a HS worker is represented by 
 
. ) ( = ) ( i wH i IW  
 
Figure 1 draws the income functions for these occupational choices. Notice that all 
agents that satisfy  1 < ) ( H i H  will choose LSE activities, while agents that satisfy 
2 1 < ) ( < H i H H  will prefer to join the labor market for high skills, and any agent  i  
that satisfies  2 > ) ( H i H  will choose to run a firm that hires high-skill workers (i.e., 
they will become high skill entrepreneurs). The figure is drawn without paying attention 
to the exogenous and endogenous parameters of the economy. As a mater of fact, later 
on we prove that at equilibrium, under specific values for the exogenous parameters of 
the model, it could be the case that no agents chooses to be a LSE, and under a different 
set of parameters, there is a unique equilibrium where all agents choose self-employment 
activities. 
Bear in mind that the income for self-employment activities does not increase with 
schooling. However, empirical evidence does not support this assumption. Results from 
Van der Sluis, Van Praag and Vijverberg (2003) and Psacharopoulos (1994) show that 
one year of schooling raises self-employment income by an average 5%. Additionally, 
these studies show that the returns from schooling are higher for wage-employement 




8 Notice that the set of occupational choices set  } , , { = H W h O  lacks the i  subscript, meaning that all 
agents face the same set of choices. As an alternative, we could have introduced a constraint where only 
agents that have a minimum level of schooling have access to entrepreneurial activities (e.g., because they 
need a license to operate or the lack of access to credit markets). This work will not follow this line of 

















Figure 1.    Income for Three Occupational Choices 
 
 
The occupational choice problem for agent  i  is  straigthforward,  
 
. }   all for    ) ( ) (    : { = ) ( O m i I i I O n i C m n ∈ ≥ ∈  
 
That is, an agent will choose the occupation that provides the highest income. Notice 
that if two occupations generate the same income to agent  i , both will be included in 
the choice set. The set of agents that select occupational choice  n  is represented by 
 
[] )} ( : 1 , 0 { = ) , ( i C n i w n ∈ ∈ ξ θ , 
 
where the wage rate  w is an endogenous variable and  )} ( , , , { = i H r k K ξ  represents 
the set of exogenous parameters of the model. The main objective of this work is to 
study the properties of the occupational sets  ) , ( w n ξ θ . Needless to say, changes in the 
values of  r i H k K ), ( , ,  and w  will modify the income functions for each occupation, 
hence it will have an impact on the  ) (ξ θn  sets. In order to simplify notation, unless 
otherwise indicated,  n θ   will represent the occupational set  ) , ( w n ξ θ . We can prove an 
important property of the occupational sets (the proof is left for the appendix): 
 
Lemma 1.   n θ   is a convex set for all  W H h n , , = . 
 
The following proposition presents one of the main results of this paper (the proof is AN OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE MODEL FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  133 
left for the appendix): 
 
Proposition  1.  If  h i θ ∈  and  W i θ ∈
∗  then 
∗ ≤ i i  and  ) ( ) (
∗ ≤ i I i I W h .  
 
That is, agents that choose self-employment over wage-employment have a lower 
educational level and a lower income level. Therefore, the structure of the model seems 
to rationalize recent empirical findings for developing countries. The following 
proposition will help us to fully characterize our main hypothesis, 
 
Proposition  2.  If  W i θ ∈  and  H i θ ∈
∗  then 
∗ ≤ i i  and  ) ( ) (
∗ ≤ i I i I H W .  
 
Therefore, high-skill entrepreneurs have the highest schooling level and are the 
richest group in the economy. The rest of this paper will study the properties of our 




3.  EQUILIBRIUM 
 
In order to characterize the demand and supply for labor, some notation needs to be 
introduced. We need to specify the agents with the lowest and highest educational levels 
that choose a specific occupation: let  ) ( inf n θ  represent the worker with the lowest 
human capital that chooses occupation  n. Similarly, let  ) ( sup n θ   be the agent from set 
n θ  that has the highest human capital. We can easily see that (the proof is left for the 
appendix): 
 
Proposition 3.   If  () w n θ  are not empty sets then i)  0 = ) ( inf h θ , ii)  1 = ) ( sup H θ , 
iii)  ) ( sup h θ ) ( inf = W θ , and iv)  = ) ( sup W θ ) ( inf H θ . 
 
We are ready to define the demand for labor. First, recall that the demand for 
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And the aggregate labor supply is   
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Notice that the convexity of  n θ  is crucial in order to have a well defined demand 
and supply for labor. We now present the equilibrium concept for this economy where, 
as it is done in most general equilibrium models, we first introduce an arbitrary 
occupational distribution vector, then we ask if there is a wage rate such that all agents 
choose voluntarily the occupational choice assigned to them and if the labor market is at 
equilibrium. More precisely, 
 
Definition 1 (Occupational Equilibrium Vector).  Let  } , , { = H W h X X X X  be an 
array of three subsets of  [0,1]  such that  [0,1] = H h W X X X ∪ ∪ . For given values of 
K k,  and r  we  say  that  X   is an Occupational Equilibrium Vector (OEV) if there is 
a wage rate  w ˆ  such that i)  ) ˆ , ( w X n i ξ θ ⊆  for all  O n∈  (Occupational Choice) and 
ii)  ) ˆ ( £ = ) ˆ ( £ w w d s   (Labor Market Equilibrium).   
 
Notice that our definition for Occupational Equilibrium Vector (OEV) lacks an 
equilibrium condition for the capital market: we could think that our economy is a small 
country that faces an exogenous interest rate and a perfectly elastic supply for capital. 
This assumption is also found in Banerjee and Newman (1996), where they assumed that 
financial claims are mediated by foreign banks that lend at a fixed interest rate. This 
assumption will allow us later on to make some comparative statics concerning changes 
in interest rates and borrowing constraints. 
In order to characterize the equilibrium for this economy, we need to introduce a 
specific representation for  ) (i H . However, assuming that an equilibrium exists, we can 
study some important properties of an OEV.   
 
 
4.  CORNER  SOLUTIONS 
 
Assume that at a given wage rate 
∗ w  the income as a worker of the most educated 
agent (i.e.,  (1)
*H w ) is equal to its income as a LSE (i.e.,  ) (1 = (1) r k H w −
∗ ). If this is 
the case, since  ) (i H  is decreasing in  i , every agent with a human capital lower than 
1 will decide to become a LSE since this occupation provides a higher return; 
furthermore, at a wage rate higher than 
∗ w , not even agent  1 = i  will choose to be a 
worker. That is, since at a wage rate lower than  (1) )/ (1 = H r k w −
∗  no agent chooses 
wage employment, we have 
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Lemma 2.    If  φ θ ≠ W  then  1 A w≥ , 
 
where  (1) )/ (1 = 1 H r k A − . That is, the previous lemma presents necessary conditions 
for the existence of an OEV where the set of agents that have wage-employment as its 




















Figure 2.   ) ( = ) ( i I i I W H  at  (1) H  
 
 
Similarly, assume that at the wage rate 
∗ w  the income as a worker of the most 
educated agent is equal to its income as a HSE. That is,   
 
(1) = ] ) (1)(1 [ H w r w H K
∗ ∗ − − . 
 
If this is the case, as figure 2 shows, every agent with a human capital lower than 1 will 
not choose to be a HSE since becoming a worker provides a higher return. Solving for 






















Therefore, since  W I  is  increasing  in w  (i.e., it shifts upwards in figure 2) and  H I  is GERARDO JACOBS  136 
decreasing in  w  (i.e., it shifts downwards), at any wage rate higher than 
∗ w  no  agent 
in the economy chooses HSE as an occupational activity. Therefore, 
 
Lemma 3.    If  H θ   is not an empty set then  2 A w≤ .  
 
Therefore, Lemmas 2 and 3 provide two necessary conditions for the existence an OEV 
with high-skill workers and HSE (i.e., the existence of a modern sector). However, this 
is not a strong result since the wage rate  w is an endogenous variable of the model. 
However, it is possible to find conditions under which one of the necessary conditions is 
always violated; therefore, if an OEV exists, the equilibrium will only have a 
self-employment sector. In order to simplify the presentation, let  2 1 = A A A − . 
 
Proposition  4.  If  X ˆ   represents an OEV and  0 > A  then  } , , {[0,1] = ˆ φ φ X . 
 
The argument of the proof is straightforward. Let w ˆ  represent the equilibrium 
wage rate. Since  0 > A  then  2 1 > A A . If w ˆ  is such that  2 1 > ˆ > A w A , because of 
Lemmas 2 and 3,  φ θ = ) ˆ (w H  and  , = ) ˆ ( φ θ w W   then the occupational distribution vector 
} , , {[0,1] φ φ   is the only OEV. Now, choose an equilibrium wage rate that is higher than 
1 A , because of Lemma 2 no one will choose wage employment (i.e.,  φ θ = W ); thus, 
since  w ˆ   is an equilibrium wage rate, it must be the case that  ) ˆ ( £ = ) ˆ ( £ w w d s , therefore 
φ θ = H . Finally, if  w ˆ   is lower than  2 A , because of Lemma 3, at equilibrium no one is 
a HSE therefore  φ θ = W  and  } , , {[0,1] = φ φ X   is the only OEV. 
Notice that proposition 4 assumed than an OEV exists; however, we can easily 
establish an existence result: 
 
Proposition  5.  If  0 > A  then  } , , {[0,1] = ˆ φ φ X   is the unique OEV.   
 
Proof.  We need to find a wage rate such that  } , , {[0,1] = ˆ φ φ X   is an OEV. Choose 
w ˆ  such that  2 1 > ˆ > A w A . Since  0 > A , this candidate wage rate exists. Because of 
Lemmas 2 and 3,  φ θ = ) ˆ (w H  and  , = ) ˆ ( φ θ w W  thus we have  0 ) ˆ ( £ ) ˆ ( £ = = w w d s  (i.e., 
labor market equilibrium). We know that  [0,1] = H h W θ θ θ ∪ ∪ , then at  w ˆ  we have 
[0,1] = ) ˆ (w h θ   (i.e., occupational choice). This proves that  } , , {[0,1] = ˆ φ φ X   is an OEV, 
uniqueness is established by proposition 4.  
 
We can also prove that the converse of proposition 5 holds (the proof is left for the 
appendix). That is, 
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Proposition  6.  If  } , , {[0,1] = ˆ φ φ X   represents an OEV then  0. > A   
 
The importance of proposition 6 will be highlighted in the following section.   
This far, we have established conditions for the existence of one corner equilibrium 
where all agents choose self-employment and there is no modern sector. Now we study 
conditions for a different OEV: only wage-employment and entrepreneurial activities. 
As before, assume that at a given wage rate 
∗ w  the income as a worker of the less 
educated agent is equal to the income as a LSE (i.e.,  ) (1 = (0) r k H w −
∗ ). If this is the 
case, since  ) (⋅ H  is an increasing function, every agent with a level of human capital 
higher than  0  will choose to be worker over been a LSE, and at a wage rate higher 
than  (0) )/ (1 = H r k w −
∗  no agent will choose to be a LSE since been a worker 
provides a higher return. Let  (0) )/ (1 = 1 H r k B − , then 
 
Lemma 4.    If  h θ   is not empty then  1 B w≤ .  
 
Similarly, let 
∗ w  be a wage rate such that the income of the LSE with the lowest 
schooling level is equal to its income as a HSE (i.e.,  ] ) (0)(1 [ = ) (1 r w H K r k − − −
∗ ). 
Solving for 
∗ w  we  get 
 
2














+ − = . 
 
Therefore, at a wage rate lower than  2 B , no even agent  0 = i   will choose to be a LSE 
since becoming a HSE provides a higher return. That is, 
 
Lemma 5.    If  h θ   is not empty then  2 B w≥ . 
 
The previous lemmas represent two necessary conditions for the existence of an 
OEV that includes a self-employment sector. The following proposition presents 
conditions under which one of the necessary conditions is always violated; therefore, if 
an OEV exists, the equilibrium is without a self-employment sector. Let  1 2 = B B B − , 
then 
 
Proposition  7.  If  X ˆ   is an OEV and  0 > B  then  } , , { = ˆ
H W X θ θ φ . 
 
The proof follows an argument similar to the one used in proposition 4 (the proof is 
omitted). Notice that proposition 7 makes no reference to the distribution between 
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functional form of  ) (i H . Therefore, we cannot establish an existence result (as in 
proposition 5). The following section will address these issues. We know that the 
converse of proposition 5 holds; however, the converse of proposition 7 is false since we 
can build an economy where  } , , { = ˆ
H W X θ θ φ  represents an OEV and  0 < B  (the 
appendix presents the counterexample). 
Now, using propositions 4 and 7, the following corollary establishes necessary 
conditions for the existence of an inside equilibrium solution: 
 
Corollary 8.  If  X ˆ represents an OEV such that  n θ  are not empty sets for all  
O n∈ , then  0 < A  and  0. < B   
 
The results obtained this far can be summarize in figure 3. First, notice that  0 > A  


























Notice that these two last inequalities are basically identical, the only difference being 
that the first one is in terms of  (1) H   while the second one depends on  (0) H . Both are 
drawn in figure 3, where  ) 1 ( / K K +  and k  were chosen in the axis since they have a 
linear relationship between them (this simplifies the presentation). Notice that when the 
exogenous variables  ) 1 ( / K K +  and  k  are in the area where  0 > A , because of 
proposition 5, there is an OEV without a modern sector. On the other hand, if 
) 1 ( / K K +  and k  are in the area where  0 > B , and an equilibrium exists, because of 
proposition 7 we have  φ θ = h  (i.e., no self-employment). These results are very 
intuitive, if  k   is a big enough, since the income of a LSE is high, all agents will choose 
this occupation. Similarly, if  K  is big enough, because of high productivity, more 
agents will choose to be a HSE, increasing the demand for labor, thus the wage rate. 
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Figure 3.   Corner  Solutions 
 
 
There is an issue in figure 3 that deserves special attention: notice that point a  
represents an equilibrium without modern sector, while in point b  there is no 
self-employment. However, we could prove that point  a , because of more resources, 
represents a higher level of per capita income, even without the presence of a modern 
sector. In other words, a contraction of the modern sector, together with an expansion of 
the self-employment sector, does not necessarily mean economic stagnation. 
Another issue deserves attention: consider the case when  (0) H   is very close  (1) H , 
which means that more years of schooling provides little value added. If this is the case, 
notice that the slopes for  0 = A  and  0 = B  will become very close. Looking to figure 
3, this means that the area between regions  0 > A  and  0 > B  vanishes as  (0) H  
approaches  (1) H . In other words, low value added shrinks the area for interior 
solutions and small movements in the economy parameters will generate sharp shifts in 
the occupational composition of the economy. This brings forward an interesting 
conjecture: does low schooling efficiency explain the sharp movements in and out of 
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5.  THE  H(I)  FUNCTION 
 
In order to study more properties of the model, we introduce a specific functional 
form for  ) (i H . Assume that  0 [0,1] : ≥ ℜ → H   has the following linear representation
9,  
 
, = ) ( i i H β α +  
 
where the lowest level of high skill is  α = (0) H  and the highest is  β α + = (1) H . 
Recall from the previous section that  ). ( inf = ) ( sup W h θ θ  In order to simplify notation, 
let  ) ( inf = ) ( sup W h hW i θ θ ≡ . That is,  hW i  represents the agent which is indifferent 
between self-employment and wage employment; therefore, the income from both 
occupations must be the same (i.e.,  ) ( = ) ( hW h hW W i I i I ), then it must be the case that   
 
. ) ( = ) (1 hW i wH r k −  
 














Similarly, we know that  ) ( inf = ) ( sup H W θ θ ; thus, let  ) ( inf = ) ( sup H W WH i θ θ ≡ . 
Therefore, agent  WH i   is indifferent between being a worker or a HSE; that is, 
 
). ( = ] ) )(1 ( [ WH WH i wH r w i H K − −  
 















Now, if  φ θ ≠ ) (w H  and  , ) ( φ θ ≠ w W  we can specify the demand and supply for 










di i H di i H K . 
 
9 All results from this section also hold for a logarithmic or an exponential function. AN OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE MODEL FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  141 
 
After evaluating the integral for  i i H β α + = ) (  and substituting the values for  hW i  
and  WH i , it is not possible to find a close form solution for the equilibrium wage rate, 
therefore the following section presents some numerical simulations. 
 
5.1.  Numerical  Simulations 
 
The exogenous parameters of the model are  } , , , , { = β α ξ K k r . The first three 
numerical simulations will study the behavior of the percentage of the population in self 
employment when the borrowings constraints and the interest rate change. In what 
follows, let  h  represent the percentage of the population in self-employment where, 
since all agents belong to the [0,1] interval, we know that  hw h i h = ) ( sup = θ . 
 
5.2.  Borrowing  Constraint  Changes 
 
An increase in the values of  k  and K  represent a relaxation of the borrowing 
constraints for the LS and HS entrepreneurs. In order to explain the way in which the 
levels of k  and  K  are chosen, we can use the following story: firms with 
administrators can get bigger maximum loans than firms without administrators, or 
alternatively, firms that hire high-skill workers get big loans, while only small loans are 
available to self-employment firms
10. 
Figure 4 presents a numerical simulation for  (1,1,1/3) = ) , , ( r β α , where  K  is in 
the  x  axis and  h   ― the percentage of self-employment ― in the  y  axis. This 
figure presents three curves: the furthermost to the left is drawn using  3/5 = k , while 
1 = k   rests in the middle and when  5/3 = k   the curve is drawn to the right. Notice that 
a relaxation of the borrowing constraint k  increases self-employment while an 
increase in  K  reduces it. The intuition is straight forward: relaxing the  k  constraint, 
increases income for agents in self-employment and agents move into this sector; on the 
other hand, an increase in  K , generates a higher demand for HS labor, thus the 
equilibrium wage rate increases and self-employment will decrease. Notice that with 
3/5 = k  (i.e., the tightest constraint), the relative size of self-employment is very 
sensitive to changes in K . Therefore, an interesting question arises: could sharp 
fluctuations on the size of self-employment, characteristic of developing countries, be 
explained by very tight borrowing constraints on the loans market for LSE? 
 
 
10 On an effort to endogenize the borrowing constraint, we could build a loan function that depends on the 

















Figure 4.  K  vs. h  for  ) (3/5,1,5/3 = k  
 
 
It is important to make a final methodological remark. In figure 4, the computational 
program used for the numerical simulation did not draw the kink of the curve at  1 = h , 
this instruction was introduced to run the simulation. Nevertheless, on a different 
numerical simulation (not shown), we found that when the value of  h  approaches the 
value of one we have  0 < A  and approaches the value of zero. Furthermore, when the 
value of  h   is higher than one, the simulation shows that  0 > A . Therefore, because of 
proposition 5, we know that a unique OEV exist with  1 = h . 
 
5.2.1.    Changes in the Interest Rate 
 
The analysis of the consequences of a change in  r   it is not straightforward. First of 
all, a raise in  r   produces two opposing forces. A decrease in the interest rate increases 
profits of the HSE, thus increasing the demand for labor and the wage rate, thus reducing 
the incentives toward self-employment. However, in the other hand, the decrease in  r  
raises the LSE income, thus improving the incentives to join this sector. Because of this, 
when  r  changes, for different values of ξ , we could get a positive or a negative 
change in  h . Nevertheless, to look into the value of  A  (i.e., the condition for a corner 
solution) is an alternative approach in order to look for the set of parameters for which 
we could expect a positive or negative impact. First of all, taking the first derivative of 
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where the sign of the derivative depends on the value of  ] ) 1 ( [ k K K − + . The following 



































Figure 6.  h ,  A vs. r  with  50 = K  and  .4 = k  
 
Two curves are drawn in figures 5 and 6, the thicker one represents  h  while the 
other one represents the value of  A. In figure 5, when  A remains positive we have GERARDO JACOBS  144 
1 = h  and when  A is negative (and decreases) the value of  h  starts to decrease. In 
this figure,  50 = K  and  3/2 = k  therefore  0 <
'
r A . On the other hand, in figure 6, 
where  .4 = k ,  h  increases together with r . As before, we can see that for this set of 
parameters  0 >
'
r A . The economic intuition of these results suggests that if  k  is large 
enough, an increase in the interest rate, because of higher costs, provides strong 
incentives to leave the self-employment sector. On the other hand, if  k   is small enough, 
the increase in costs for the LSE will be small compared to the decrease in wages result 
of a lower demand for HS workers, thus some agents will move from wage-employment 
to self-employment. 
Though it is not shown in both figures, as a result of a lower interest rate, the average 
income per capita of the economy increases in both cases.
11 Nevertheless, as we have 
seen, depending on the parameters of the model, the LSE sector could expand or 
contract. That is, this exercise provides conditions under which, given a change in  r , 
the self-employment sector behaves on a cyclical or countercyclical form. 
 
5.2.2.    Changes on Educational Efficiency 
 
This section studies changes on the function that transforms schooling into high skill 
productivity.
12 This far, we have assumed that  i i H β α + = ) ( , thus an increase in  β  
symbolizes an overall increase in high skill productivity.
13 Therefore, we can expect an 
increase in the number of HSE and an increase in wages, thus an incentive to leave 
self-employment. 
Figure 7 presents the results for changes in  β  and its impact on the proportion of 
agents in self-employment. The simulation was done with (α ,  K ,  r )=(1,5,3/2). 
Again, three curves are presented: the one to the left is drawn with a value of  3/2 = k , 
while the one further to the right uses a  4 = k   value. As expected, we see a drop in the 
number of LSE. Again, notice that, for low values of  k  and β , the proportion of 
agents in self-employment is very sensitive to changes in  β . 
 
11 Our measure of per capita income (net of cost of capital) is:   
) (1 ) ( 1 ) (1 WH hW i Kr di i H i K i r k
WH − − ∫ + − . 
12 We omit the low skill case since an increase in low skill productivity, because of the binding borrowing 
constraint, has no impact on the equilibrium values of the economy. Since all agents are indexed in the 
interval  [0,1],  that represents schooling level, we could change the maximum years of schooling by 
indexing agents in the  ] [0,s  interval, where an increase in s  represents an increase in the years of 
schooling of the most educated agent. This section will follow a different exercise: changes in the educational 
efficiency (i.e., the  ) (i H   function) which represents how schooling transfers into productive skills. 



















Figure 7.  h  vs. β  for  ) (3/2,5/2,4 = k  
 
 
5.2.3.    The Average Size of Business Firms 
 
This far we have focused our analysis on changes in  h . Nevertheless, as in Lucas 
(1978), we can also study the average size of business firms (ASBF). Figure 8 presents 
the changes in the proportion of the population who chooses to be a HSE when there is 
an increase in  K . Again, three curves are drawn for  (1,1.5,2) = β , where a higher  β  
shifts the curve upwards thus increasing the number of HSE.   
Notice that the number of HSE, after an initial increase, decreases as the value of 
K  increases, as a matter of fact, the three functions converge to zero as K  
approaches infinity. The result is not surprising, since bigger firms increase their 
demand for labor (thus raising wages), therefore agents shift from HSE to wage 










































Figure 9.   ASBF  vs. K  for  (1,1.5,2) = β  
 
 
Figure 9 presents the average size of business firms (i.e., the number of workers 
divided by the amount of HSE) drawn against  K . Again, three curves are drawn for 
(1,1.5,2) = β , where a rise in  β  shifts the curve upwards. First, notice that the ASBF 
increases as  K  increases, probably not very surprising since the proportion of HSE 
converges to zero as  K   increases. What might be a little surprising is the impact on the AN OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE MODEL FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  147 
ASBF when  β  raises. First, as we mentioned before, the number of HSE increases 
when the schooling efficiency is higher, therefore we might expect a decrease in the 
ASBF; however, the ASBF increases. The intuition for this result can be drawn from the 
previous section, where an increase in β   reduces the number of agents in 
self-employment, therefore when β  increases we have more HSE but also more 
workers, therefore the ASBF increases. 
Wrapping up, we proved that high borrowing constraints in the modern sector of the 
economy and low schooling efficiency (both very common in less developed economies) 
causes a small size of business firms. 
 
5.2.4.  Distribution  of  Schooling  Resources 
 
This section introduces a different  ) (i H  distribution for the transfer of schooling 
into high skill productivity. This will allow us to study some public policy choices. 
Assume that a policy maker has the possibility of shifting resources in order to increase 
efficiency in the later years of schooling. For example, we could reduce resources in 
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Figure 10.  T w o   ) (i H  Distributions 
 
 
Figure 10 presents this policy alternative: we select the parameters for both 
distributions in such a way that the area under the curve is the same for both 
distributions, thus the total amount of value added remains the unchanged. In this figure, 
the  ) ( 2 2 i β α +  distribution generates higher returns on the later years of education, GERARDO JACOBS  148 
while punishing the returns from early schooling. We choose  (1,1) = ) , ( β α  for  the  first 
distribution and  (0,3) = ) , ( β α   for the second one. We easily see that the area under the 
curve is the same one for both distributions. The results for the numerical simulations 

































Figure 12.    Per Capita Income vs.  K  for  (1,1) = ) , ( β α  and  (0,3) = ) , ( β α  
 
 
Figure 11 shows that, for low levels of  K , the number of LSE decreases. However, 
for high levels of  K  the result is reversed. The initial decrease is not difficult to see AN OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE MODEL FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  149 
since, with higher efficiency for the HSE, the demand for labor increases together with 
the equilibrium wage rate, thus driving down the number of agents in self-employment. 
On the other hand, we know that  h  decreases  when K   increases; however, the policy 
shift makes  0 = (0) H , meaning that it is harder to reduce self-employment since the 
income from wage-employment has decreased substantially for low levels of schooling. 
An interesting result is depicted in figure 12, where the numerical simulation shows 
how the per capita income has increased with the new policy. The intuition is 
straightforward: the new distribution frees resources from low levels of schooling, which 
are idle since people with low schooling will join self-employment anyway. This idle 
resources increases productivity of HSE, thus profits increase together with salaries. 
Also, agents that switch from LSE to wage employment will improve their welfare level. 
To reduce instead the resources into higher education, since you are educating low skill 
agents that will not use their new learn skills, will produce more self-employment and 
lower per capita income. Notice that this exercise does not take into account the dynamic 
aspects of the policy. More precisely, increasing resources in early schooling might 
increase the learning capacities of agents at later years; that is, the  ) (i H  curve could 
experience a upward shift on the long run. Our model cannot capture the dynamic 
aspects from this policy change. 
 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS  AND  EXTENSIONS 
 
We studied some development issues and the conditions under which the 
self-employment sector behaves on a cyclical or countercyclical form. Also, since this 
paper is centered on human capital differences, we paid special attention to the success 
or failure of schooling efficiency. Nonetheless, some extensions can be made in order to 
study alternative policy issues. Among them: 
 
• Minimum wage considerations could be introduced in order to study welfare 
considerations.  
•  As we mentioned in section 2, agents do not have the choice of voluntary 
unemployment. Extensions can be introduced in order to study unemployment 
compensation policies. 
•  Recall that the parameters k  and  K  are exogenous to the model. An 
interesting extension could be to introduce an endogenous borrowing constraint. A 
possibility is to attach borrowing constraints to educational attainment, this way the 
model could produce a new sector of LSE that hires workers and is richer than wage 
earners (but poorer than HSE). That is, we could build a model as in Banerjee and 
Newman (1993) and Antunes and Cavalcanti (2002), but without ruling out the presence 
of LSE that chooses self-employment activities and is poorer than agents in 
wage-employment. This way the model could produce a richer set of occupational GERARDO JACOBS  150 
choices. 
• A consequence of adopting a uniform distribution where agents belong to the 
closed interval  [ ] 0,1 , as we did in this paper, is that there are no two agents with the 
same schooling level, which is highly unrealistic. A follow up to this model could 
consist in adopting more realistic schooling distributions.   
• Welfare considerations were not tackled in depth in this paper. However, the task 
could be interesting and challenging. For example, an interesting issue is the choice of 
an appropriate welfare measure. One candidate could be the average income of each 
sector of the economy. However, this measure could be misleading. For example, a 
policy that reduces the income of the HSE will bring about a movement from HSE to 
wage earners but, since the poorer HSE will leave this sector, it could be that the per 
capita income of the sector increases, signaling incorrectly that the welfare of this sector 
has improved.   
 
While it is not difficult to introduce and study these extensions, we decided not to 
deviate from the original objectives: a) to show that traditional models on occupational 
choice are not the best way to describe some facts from some developing economies, 







Lemma 1.  The sets  i θ  are convex. a) Convexity of  h θ . We want to prove that if 
) (w i h θ ∈  and  ), (w i h θ ∈ ′  then  ) (w i h θ ∈ ′ ′ , where  i i i ′ − + = ′ ′ ) (1 α α  and  0,1]. [ ∈ α  
Assume that  i i ′ < . Since  ) (w i h θ ∈ ′  we know that  > ) (1 r k − ) (i wH ′ . Now, since 
i i ′ ′ ≥ ′ and  () H  is increasing in i , then  ≥ ′) (i wH ), (i wH ′ ′  so  > ) (1 r k − ). (i wH ′ ′  It 
is left to prove that  )]. ) ( ) [(1 = ) ( > ) (1 r i H w K i I r k H − ′ ′ − ′ ′ −  Again,  since  ) ( < w i i h θ ∈ ′ , 
we know that  ) ( > ) (1 i I r k H −  and  ) ( > ) (1 i I r k H ′ − . If  0 > ) (1 w −  then  () H I  is 
increasing in i  and  ≥ ′ − ) ( > ) (1 i I r k H ) (i IH ′ ′ . If it is the case that  0 ) (1 ≤ − w  then 
() H I   is not increasing in i  and  ≥ − ) ( > ) (1 i I r k H ) (i IH ′ ′  so  we  have 
) ( > ) (1 i I r k H ′ ′ − . A similar argument holds for b) convexity of  W θ   and c) convexity of 
H θ . 
 
Proposition 1.  i) if  h i θ ∈  and  W i θ ∈
∗  then 
∗ ≤ i i  and ii)  W i θ ∈  and  H i θ ∈
∗  
then 
∗ ≤ i i . i) Since  ) (w i h θ ∈  then  ) ( > ) (1 i wH r k − . Also, since  ) (w i W θ ∈
∗ , then 
) (1 > ) ( r k i wH −
∗  therefore  ) ( > ) ( i H i H
∗ . We know that  ) (i H  is an increasing AN OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE MODEL FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  151 
function, therefore  . > i i
∗  ii) Since  ) (w i W θ ∈ , then  > ) (i wH )] ) ( ) [(1 r i H w K − − . 
Rearranging terms we get  ] ) / ( ) )[(1 ( > K w w i H r − − . Also, since  ) (w i H θ ∈
∗ , it must 
be the case that  ) ( < )] ) ( ) [(1
∗ ∗ − − i wH r i H w K . Rearranging terms we get 
r K w w i H > ] ) / ( ) )[(1 ( − −
∗  therefore  ). ( > ) ( i H i H
∗  Thus,  since  ) (i H  is  an 
increasing function, we have  i i >
∗ . 
 
Proposition  2.  i)  if  h i θ ∈  and  W i θ ∈
∗  then  ) ( ) (
∗ ≤ i I i I W h   and ii) if  W i θ ∈  and 
H i θ ∈
∗  then  ) ( ) (
∗ ≤ i I i I H W . i) By definition we know that  ) (1 = ) ( r k i Ih −  and that 
) ( = ) ( i wH i Iw
∗ , since  ) (w i W θ ∈
∗   it must be the case that  ) (1 > ) ( r k i wH −
∗ , 
therefore  ). ( > ) ( i I i I h w
∗  ii) By definition we know that  ) ( = ) ( i wH i Iw  and that 
)] ) ( ) [(1 = ) ( r i H w K i IH − −
∗ ∗ . Since  ) (w i H θ ∈
∗   it must be the case that 
) ( > )] ) ( ) [(1
∗ ∗ − − i wH r i H w K . From proposition 1 we know that if  ) (w i W θ ∈  and 
) (w i H θ ∈
∗  then 
∗ i i > . We know that  ) (i H   is an increasing function and  i i >
∗ , then 
) ( > ) ( i H i H
∗ , therefore  ) ( > ) ( > )] ) ( ) [(1 i wH i wH r i H w K
∗ ∗ − −  which proves that 
). ( > ) ( i I i I w H
∗     
 
Proposition 3.   If  () w j θ  are not empty sets then: i)  0 = ) ( inf h θ , ii)  1 = ) ( sup H θ , 
iii)  ) ( inf = ) ( sup W h θ θ  and iv)  ) ( inf = ) ( sup H W θ θ . i) Let  )) ( ( inf = w i h θ ′ . Assume that 
0, ≠ ′ i then  ) ( 0 w h θ ∉  and either  ) ( 0 w W θ ∈  or  ). ( 0 w H θ ∈  If  ) ( 0 w W θ ∈  then it 
exists an 0 = i′ ′  such that  ) (w i W θ ∈ ′ ′  where  i i ′ ′ ′ < . This contradicts proposition 2 
where if  ) (w i W θ ∈ ′ ′  then  i i > ′ ′  for  all  ) (w i h θ ∈ . We build the same argument for the 
) ( 0 w H θ ∈  case. ii) Let  )). ( ( sup = w i H
' θ  Assume that  1 ≠ ′ i , then  ) ( 1 w H θ ∉  and 
either  ) ( 1 w W θ ∈  or  ) ( 1 w h θ ∈ . If  ) ( 1 w W θ ∈  then it exists an 1 = i′ ′  such that 
) (w i W θ ∈ ′ ′  and  i i ′ ′ ′ > . This contradicts proposition 2 where if  ) (w i W θ ∈ ′ ′  then  i i < ′ ′  
for all  ) (w i H θ ∈ . We build the same argument for the case where  ) ( 1 w h θ ∈ . iii) 
Assume that  )) ( ( inf )) ( ( sup w w W h θ θ ≠ . Let  )) ( ( sup = w i h θ ′  and  )) ( ( inf = w i W θ ′ ′ . If 
i i ′ ′ ′>  then there exist  ) (w i h θ ∈ ′  and  ) (w i W θ ∈ ′ ′  such that  i i ′ ′ ′> . This contradicts 
proposition 2 where if  ) (w i W θ ∈ ′ ′  then  i i > ′ ′  for  all  ). (w i h θ ∈  Now,  if 
)) ( ( inf < )) ( ( sup w w W h θ θ   then it must exist an i ′ ′ ′ ) (w H θ ∈  such  that 
)). ( ( inf < < )) ( ( sup w i w W h θ θ ′ ′ ′  Recall that  ) ( 1 w H θ ∈  therefore  1 )) ( ( inf < ≤ ′ ′ ′ w i W θ , 
but since i ′ ′ ′ ) (w H θ ∈ , this violates the convexity of  ) (w H θ  from proposition 1. iv) 
Assume that  )). ( ( inf )) ( ( sup w w H W θ θ ≠  Let  )) ( ( sup = w i W θ ′  and  )) ( ( inf = w i H θ ′ ′ . If 
i i ′ ′ ′>  then there exist  ) (w i W θ ∈ ′  and  ) (w i H θ ∈ ′ ′  such that  i i ′ ′ ′> . This contradicts GERARDO JACOBS  152 
proposition 2 where if  ) (w i H θ ∈ ′ ′  then  i i > ′ ′  for  all  ). (w i W θ ∈  Now  if 
)) ( ( inf < )) ( ( sup w w H W θ θ   then it must exist an i ′ ′ ′ ) (w h θ ∈  such  that 
)). ( ( inf < < )) ( ( sup w i w H W θ θ ′ ′ ′  Recall that  ) ( 0 w h θ ∈  therefore  i w W ′ ′ ′ ≤ < )) ( ( sup 0 θ , 
but since  i ′ ′ ′ ) (w h θ ∈ , this violates the convexity of  ) (w h θ  from  proposition  1. 
 
Proposition 6.    If  } , , {[0,1] = ˆ φ φ X  represents an OEV then  0 > A . Let 
* w  
represent the equilibrium wage rate. Since  W θ  are  H θ  empty sets, it must be the case 
that for all agents: 
 
) (1 < ) ( ) (1 < ] ) )(1 ( [
* * r k i H w and r k r w i H K − − − − . 
 
Evaluating for  1 = i   and solving the two inequalities in terms of 
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That is,  0 > A . 
 
The Counterexample for the converse of Proposition 7.    We are looking for a set of 
parameters such that  } , , { = ˆ
H W X θ θ φ   represents an OEV and  0 < B . Let 
i i H β α + = ) ( . Also, choose  ,1) (1/3,1,1,5 = ) , , , , ( k K r β α . Using this parameters, it is 
the case that  0 < B . We have left to prove that there is an OEV with no 
self-employment for this set of parameters. Choose  .68 =
* w  as  candidate  for 
equilibrium wage. We can see that  (0) < ) (1
*H w r k − , which means that the agent with 
the lowest schooling level is better off in wage employment than in self-employment, 
therefore no agent will choose at 
* w  self-employment as an occupation. We can also 
prove that for  .68 =
* w   labor supply equals demand for labor; therefore, AN OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE MODEL FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  153 
} , , { = ˆ
H W X θ θ φ   is an OEV for this economy. 
REFERENCES 
 
Antunes, A., and T. Cavalcanti (2002), “Entrepreneurship and Informal Markets,” 
Manuscript. 
Banerjee, A., and A. Newman (1993), “Occupational Choice and the Process of 
Development,” Journal of Political Economy, 2. 
Blau, D. (1985), “Self-Employment and Self-Selection in Developing Country Labor 
Markets,” Southern Economic Journal, 52. 
Galli, R., and D. Kucera (2003), “Informal Employment in Latin America: Movements 
over Business Cycles and the Effects on Worker Rights,” Discussion Paper, 
International Institute for Labor Studies, Geneva, 145. 
Harris, J., and M. Todaro (1969), “Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two 
Sector Model,” American Economic Review, 60(1). 
Kihlstrom, R., and J. Laffont (1979), “A General Equilibrium Entrepreneurial Theory of 
the Firm Based on Risk Aversion,” Journal of Political Economy, 87. 
Le, A. (1999), “Empirical Studies of Self-Employment,” Journal of Economic Surveys, 
13(4), 381-416. 
Lucas, R. (1978), “On the Size Distribution of Business Firms,” Bell Journal of 
Economics. 
Maloney, W.F. (1999), “Does Informality Imply Segmentation in Urban Labor 
Markets?” The World Bank Economic Review, 13(2), 275-302. 
Mead, D.C., and C. Liedhold (1998), “The Dynamics of Micro and Small Enterprises in 
Development Countries,” World Development, 26(1), 61-74. 
Mezal, L. (1998), “The Returns of Education in Mexico (1998-2002),” Working Paper, 
Universidad Iberoamericana. 
Psacharopoulos, G. (1994), “Returns to Investment in Education: A Global Update,” 
World Development, 22, 1325-1343. 
Van der Sluis, J., M. Van Praag, and W. Vijverberg (2003), “Entrepreneurship Selection 
Performance: A Meta-Analysis of the Impact of Education in Less Developed 
Countries,” Discussion Paper, Timbergen Institute, University of Amsterdam. 
Van Praag, C., and J. Cramer (2001), “The Roots of Entrepreneurship and Labor 




Mailing Address: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Campus Getafe, Departamento de 
Economia, CP 28903 Madrid, Spain. Tel: 34-916-249-555. E-mail: gjacobs@eco.uc3m.es 
 
Manuscript received January, 2007; final revision received May, 2008. 